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hen we consider monetary policy, there
is some common ground on which most
economists can readily agree. But there
are also more contentious issues ￿ areas
with legitimate room for disagreement. In this
article, President Santomero reviews both the areas
of agreement and the areas open to debate and
offers his perspective on them. He concludes with
some thoughts about the implications for the
conduct of monetary policy.
Most Fed policymakers ￿
indeed, most professional economists
today ￿ would agree that (1) the goal
of monetary policy is to help create an
economic environment that fosters
maximum sustainable growth, and
(2) the most important contribution the
Fed can make to that environment is to
provide price stability.
Behind this philosophy of
appropriate monetary policy goals lie
some important economic principles
on which, again, I think there is broad
agreement.
The first economic principle is
that price stability is crucial to a well-
functioning market economy. Prices are
signals to market participants. A stable
overall price level allows people to
clearly recognize shifts in relative prices
and adjust their decisions
about spending, saving, working, and
investing in welfare-enhancing ways.
Inflation, by contrast, jumbles and
distorts price signals and generates
bad economic decisions.
The second economic
principle is that price stability is a
contribution to financial stability and
attendant economic growth that only
monetary policy can make. We know
that relative prices will fluctuate in
response to shifts in the supply or
demand for particular products, but it
takes a persistent influx of excess money
and credit to sustain a general inflation.
At the same time, money is neutral in
the long run. That is to say, changing
the supply of money does not affect the
pool of real resources available to the
economy, and so, ultimately, it affects
only the price level.
To these two principles I will
add two empirical observations about
which I hope we can also agree.
The first is this: For the past 22
years, the Fed has focused on the goal
of price stability and has been relatively
successful in achieving it. We took the
economy from the double-digit inflation
of the late 1970s to a core inflation
rate in the range of 2 to 3 percent ￿ a
range approaching essential price
stability, that is, inflation low enough to
no longer significantly influence
economic decisions.
Equally important, as the
downward trend in market interest
rates attests, we have succeeded in
reducing inflation expectations. Market
participants not only see stable prices
today, but they also expect stable prices
to persist for the foreseeable future. This
is evident from a number of sources.
Not surprisingly, the Philadelphia Fed￿s
Survey of Professional Forecasters is my
personal favorite. Long-term inflation
expectations, measured in our survey
as the average rate of change in the
CPI over the next 10 years, have held
steady at 2.5 percent since early
1999. Establishing and maintaining
confidence in the Fed￿s goal of reaching
for price stability is crucial to fostering
productive saving and investment
decisions.
The second empirical
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progress toward that





economists will agree concerns the Fed￿s
policy strategy. We talk about monetary
policy, recognize that inflation is a
monetary phenomenon, and express
belief in the neutrality of money. But
the mechanism used to achieve our goal
of price stability no longer involves
setting targets for monetary aggregates.
Indeed, the entire disinflation period
coincides with the abandonment of one
monetary aggregate after another, as
none exhibited a predictable velocity.
Rather, the Fed￿s policy
strategy has been to move the fed funds
rate in the direction it thinks necessary
to achieve its inflation target and bring
aggregate demand into balance with the
economy￿s long-run potential supply.
This is the essence of the so-called
Taylor rule.
The principles and
observations I￿ve just enumerated
deliver a straightforward answer to the
question of what monetary policy can
do. Monetary policy can and should
strive to establish a stable price
environment, and the Fed has made
considerable progress toward that
goal by pursuing a persistent, if not
particularly precise, strategy over the
past 20 years.
Of course, this is where
the controversy begins. Having
acknowledged that monetary policy
can and should provide long-term
price stability, the question arises: Can
monetary policy do more? Some would
say monetary policy cannot do more.
Advocates of this view believe that
attempting to do more is unlikely to
improve economic performance in the
short-term and, in fact, may even impair
economic performance in the long term.
Others would say that
monetary policy can do more. It can go
beyond stabilizing prices in the long term
and help stabilize the real economy￿s
performance in the short term. That is to
say, they believe monetary policy can be
used to manage overall demand with
sufficient precision over sufficiently
short periods of time to reduce the
volatility of output or employment in
the face of demand or supply shocks.
Is this so?
Unfortunately, to my mind
the answer is not a simple yes or no. It
depends on the characteristics of the
shocks and the state of economic
science.
An analogy is helpful here.
Suppose I raise this question: ￿Can
doctors cure people?￿ One response
might be: ￿Doctors can help people
suffering from a variety of illnesses. In
some cases, they can completely cure
the patient of the illness. In other cases,
they can mute the symptoms. In still
others, they can do very little. I expect
that over time, as medical knowledge
and technique improve, doctors will be
able to treat more illnesses and treat
them more effectively. But even the
most optimistic person doubts that we
can ever conquer all of the maladies
facing humanity.￿
The situation is similar for
monetary policy. Monetary policy can be
used to eliminate or at least mute the
impact of some shocks to the economy,
but not all. And, over time, as economic
knowledge and policy techniques
improve, policymakers￿ capacity to
stabilize the economy should and has
increased.
I think the medical analogy
is useful. But it is just an analogy.
Economics is not medicine. The speed
with which the two disciplines make
progress and the ultimate bounds on
their capacity to improve welfare are
not necessarily the same. We all stand
in awe of the accomplishments that
medicine has achieved in the last 50 or
100 years. Furthermore, we all anticipate
tremendous progress in medical science
in the years ahead.
The past and likely future
course of monetary economics is not so
clear. Monetary economics has made
significant progress over the years.
We are surely better at responding to
demand-side shocks than we were
in the 1930s. We are also better at
responding to supply-side shocks than
we were in the 1970s.
On the other hand, how
closely can we calibrate the proper
monetary policy response to sudden
demand or supply disturbances? I think
the answer is: not all that closely. Look,
for example, at the Fed￿s response to the
productivity growth surge of the past
few years or to the stock market
correction. Not surprisingly, with the
benefit of hindsight, the calibration was
not perfect. Can we reasonably expect
to operate at a higher level of precision
in the near future? I do not believe so.
As policymakers, we face
considerable limitations on our capacity
to assess, analyze, and shape economic
conditions. We are limited in three
fundamental ways.
First, our capacity to measure
and benchmark the economy￿s
performance is limited. What is the
current economic situation? How
close are we to the economy￿s supply
potential? How robust is demand
relative to that potential? These
are questions we can answer only
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The data on which we rely in real time can be
imprecise enough to distort the tenor of our
policy deliberations and the apparent wisdom
of alternative policy actions.
As professional economists,
we all know that our measurements of
current economic conditions are subject
to almost constant revision. The point I
want to emphasize today is that these
revisions can be substantial enough to
change policymakers￿ perception of
the need for or at least the extent of
policy action.
This is an issue that we in
Philadelphia have spent considerable
effort analyzing. Currently, our Bank
is in the midst of a research project
called the real-time data set for
macroeconomists, being led by Dean
Croushore and Tom Stark of our
Research Department. The project
assembles macroeconomic time series
as they were recorded at specific points
in time and explores the implications of
data revisions for economic forecasting,
hypothesis testing, and policymaking.*
For my purposes here, suffice it to say
that examining these time series of
different vintages provides an interesting
perspective on monetary policymakers￿
situation.
For example, in early October
1992 policymakers were contemplating
action to stimulate the economy
because they were concerned that the
recovery from the recession of 1990-91
was stalling. To someone looking at the
real GDP series we are using today, this
anxiety would seem strange. The data
show that real GDP grew at 3.8 percent
in both the first and second quarters of
1992 and at 3.1 percent in the third
quarter. But policymakers￿ concerns
seem much more reasonable when you
look at the real GDP series they were
using back in the fall of 1992. That
series showed growth of just 2.9 percent
in the first quarter of 1992 and 1.5
percent in the second quarter. This
example shows that the data on which
we rely in real time can be imprecise
enough to distort the tenor of our policy
deliberations and the apparent wisdom
of alternative policy actions.
Aside from such basic
measurement problems, there is the
issue of getting good readings on the
economic parameters by which
monetary policymakers get their
bearings: a benchmark for potential
output on the supply side and for the
appropriate real interest rate on the
demand side.
On the supply side, consider
the current discussion about the U.S.
economy￿s long-run capacity for growth.
The remarkable gains in productivity
that occurred in the latter half of the
1990s came as something of a surprise to
economists. The persistence of those
gains has convinced most of us that
technological innovations have elevated
underlying productivity growth
significantly from that of the prior two
decades. I personally believe that
productivity growth will remain elevated
as firms learn to make better use of the
technology they purchase. But the truth
is that the current state of economists￿
knowledge about the interplay of
technology, innovation, and productivity
does not afford us much more than a
good guess as to the pace and pattern of
potential supply growth in the future.
On the demand side,
policymakers face a similar knowledge
gap. Since the instrument of monetary
policy is the fed funds rate, the strategy
of monetary policy is to set the short-
term real interest rate at an appropriate
level relative to its long-run equilibrium
value. What is that equilibrium value?
It is not a constant, of course.
It is the outcome of myriad individual
saving and investment decisions,
themselves predicated on factors subject
to numerous fluctuations, such as
changes in stock market wealth,
perceived business opportunities, and
fiscal policy. As a practical matter, the
equilibrium interest rate may turn out
to be relatively constant over time or
subject to relatively easily predicted
shifts. But, again, the state of our
knowledge is limited. To put this issue
in a current context, we might all agree
that the federal tax cut package has
increased the equilibrium real rate for
the economy, but I think we would be
hard pressed to agree by how much or
for how long. Or I could have made a
similar reference to the effect of the
recent wealth contraction and its effect
on interest rates.
To summarize, one
fundamental limitation on monetary
policymakers￿ capacity to stabilize the
economy in the short run is their limited
capacity to measure or gauge economic
performance very precisely, particularly
in real time.
A second fundamental
limitation on monetary policymakers￿
capacity for economic stabilization is
much broader. It is the limited capacity
of economic science to model people￿s
economic behavior.
I believe market expectations
are rational in the long run. But in the
short run, the marketplace is beset by
waves of optimism and pessimism that
move expectations irrationally. We
should not lose sight of the fact that
* See ￿A Summary of the Conference on
Real-Time Data Analysis￿ on page 5. This
conference was held at the Philadelphia
Fed in October 2001.4   Q1 2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
market participants are human beings,
subject to emotions that can cause them
to overreact or underreact to events.
The result can be a significant change
in spending that is neither sustainable
nor socially desirable. The problem is
that economic science provides little
guidance as to their occurrence, impact,
or likely persistence of such episodes. So
it is difficult for policymakers to frame a
response to them.
I do not think we should ignore
indicators of consumer and business
confidence. If a shift in confidence is likely
to introduce a substantial change in overall
demand, monetary policy can and should
respond with the aim of restoring demand
growth to a pace consistent with potential
supply. But I do not think the Fed has or
should routinely take policy actions to
boost expectations or bolster confidence.
The third and final limitation
on policymakers￿ capacity to stabilize the
economy in the short run is a familiar one:
Monetary policy is a blunt instrument with
an impact subject to long and variable lags.
This is hardly news. In recent months, it has
become a mantra in business news
broadcasts that Fed interest rate cuts can
take six to nine months or more to begin
boosting the economy.
What I￿d like to call attention
to is the irony that while there seems to
be broader recognition that monetary
policy is a blunt instrument, there also
seems to be more strident calls for the
Fed to use it with surgical precision.
Financial market participants seem to
expect prompt and precisely calibrated
monetary policy actions that yield
predictably timed and measured
economic results. Such expectations are
just not realistic. The danger I see in
such unrealistic expectations is that not
meeting them ￿ which is inevitable ￿
could unnecessarily traumatize financial
markets and undermine broader public
confidence, thereby unnecessarily
debilitating the performance of the
economy.
Let me now turn to the third,
and last, topic I want to address: What
are the implications of all this for the
Fed￿s conduct of monetary policy?
First and foremost, as I said
earlier, monetary policy can and should
provide a stable price environment.
The Fed has been making substantial
progress toward this goal in the U.S.
over the past several decades. Its precise
methods and strategies have varied, but
focus and persistence were primary
ingredients in the Fed￿s success.
I think monetary policy can
and should also contribute significantly
to the short-run stability of the real
economy. However, we must admit that
the state of our economic knowledge
and the efficacy of our monetary policy
tools are limited in some fundamental
ways. We cannot eliminate the business
cycle entirely. What we can do is mute
the impact of large and persistent
negative shocks to the economy. The
way to do this is to take full advantage
of the knowledge and policy leverage
we have available. I think the Fed has
done this relatively well in recent years
and continues to do so.
I have been participating in
FOMC meetings for almost two years
as a Fed president. Over this period I
have seen that in making monetary
policy decisions, the Fed uses the
organizational structure of the FOMC
to its best advantage. Reserve Bank
presidents are constantly collecting
up-to-date intelligence on current and
likely future economic and financial
conditions from their Banks￿ boards of
directors and through the contacts they
make in the everyday course of
operating a Reserve Bank. The insights
from this direct contact, coupled with
the information from surveys like
our Bank￿s Business Outlook Survey,
sharpen the picture we get from the
other available statistics. I believe
the composite picture of national
economic conditions that emerges as the
presidents and governors convene
around the FOMC table is as accurate
and up-to-date a representation as
occurs anywhere in government or
the private sector.
Nonetheless, not all
uncertainties are resolved around that
table, and I think the decisions that
the FOMC makes reflect a prudent
approach to dealing with the
uncertainties remaining. We generally
move in careful increments at a
measured pace. That kind of persistent,
incremental action in what we perceive
to be the right direction is likely to
contribute more to economic stability
than aggressive attempts at fine-tuning.
Implementation of a monetary policy
committed to price stability and
achievable real sector stabilization
ultimately generates the reasonable
market expectations and public
confidence we seek.
 Looking ahead, we will
continue trying to increase our
knowledge and improve our policy
strategies. Whether we can, in fact,
achieve essential price stability and
increase our capacity to stabilize the real
economy, only time will tell. Meanwhile,
in the interest of maintaining public
confidence, I think it is important for
the Fed to establish realistic public
expectations about what monetary











are just not realistic.